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“It is essential for human flourishing that we conduct substantial parts of our lives unobserved.”
— Tiffany Jenkins
Hallways were the first privacy technology.
Back in 1716, the Duchess of Marlborough questioned the architect designing Blenheim Palace because of the unusually long, narrow rooms he had planned for the estate. The architect had to patiently explain that these corridors were no more than a passage between rooms, serving to connect spaces rather than serve as living areas themselves. Another contemporary builder articulated the radical purpose of this revolutionary new design: “All the Rooms in this House are private; that is, there is a Way into each of them without passing through any other Room.”
In other words, hallways created privacy.
It took a full century for this architectural feature to become commonplace, as cultural historian Tiffany Jenkins writes in her book, Strangers and Intimates: The Rise and Fall of Private Life. But once it did, the Victorians embraced the concept wholeheartedly. Before the invention and widespread adoption of the hallway, there was no strictly separate private sphere. There was no aspect of life where others could not legitimately intrude. The outside world could pry into anyone’s business, and indeed, it was expected to do so. Curiosity and nosiness were practically mandated by the social norms of the era.
Counterintuitively, that social paradigm began to change with the arrival of the Puritans, whose fierce insistence that matters of religion and conscience should remain private freedoms established the very first barriers that the secular state could not cross. Once established, this initial zone of non-interference expanded into a broader Victorian definition of privacy that gradually came to protect bedrooms, personal communications, and private commerce.
This burgeoning privacy zone was severely tested in 1844, when the British government was caught opening the letters of the political exile Giuseppe Mazzini to snoop on his correspondence with Italian revolutionaries. Mazzini brilliantly proved the government’s surveillance by having his friends mail him seemingly innocent packages containing only small grains of sand and poppy seeds. When the letters arrived at his door otherwise empty—the grains having fallen out during the government’s clumsy, covert inspection—the blatant breach of privacy sparked instant and widespread national outrage.
Public figures were quick to condemn the practice. Thomas Carlyle called opening a man’s letters a “scoundrelism” directly equivalent to picking his pocket. Radical Member of Parliament Thomas Duncombe declared that the practice was “subversive of the public confidence essential to a commercial country.” Most tellingly of all, the intricate plots of two major Charles Dickens novels—Bleak House and Little Dorrit—revolved entirely around stolen letters that threatened to expose sensitive family connections and private economic dealings.
All of these cultural flashpoints confirmed, as Tiffany Jenkins observes, that a profound revolution in the value and esteem of privacy had successfully taken place across society.
From Cultural Ideal to Legal Struggle
But while the Victorians were the first to embrace this cultural ideal, the United States was the first to attempt to write it into law—sort of.
In 1890, legal scholars Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published The Right to Privacy, a foundational and influential article arguing for a fundamental “right to be let alone.” The piece was written in direct response to the escalating privacy intrusions of modern newspapers and the advent of early photography, which threatened to capture and broadcast private moments to the masses.
This was a seminal moment in the history of privacy, Jenkins writes. Yet, in the course of researching and drafting their landmark article, the two lawyers observed a surprising and glaring gap in American jurisprudence: there was no mention of privacy anywhere in the United States Constitution, not even within the amendments of the Bill of Rights.
Despite the profound influence of the article on public discourse, this constitutional silence on privacy persisted for decades, leaving citizens vulnerable to technological advancements.
In 1928, the Supreme Court upheld the federal government’s use of warrantless wiretaps in the landmark case Olmstead v. United States. The court ruled that wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment because there had been no physical trespass onto the defendant’s private property during the interception.
Writing a powerful dissent on behalf of four justices, Justice Louis Brandeis issued a chilling warning. He wrote that “the progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.”
Naturally, exactly that kind of surveillance capability has come to pass. Less prophetically, Brandeis also warned that advances in the psychic and related sciences might someday bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts, and emotions.
It was not until 1965, in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut, that the Supreme Court finally asserted a constitutional right to privacy. And even then, achieving that legal milestone required some remarkably creative judicial logic. To rule that privacy is an inherent constitutional right, Jenkins notes, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the specific guarantees found within the Bill of Rights possess “penumbras”—shadows cast by those guarantees—which, when drawn together, add up to a de facto right to privacy.
Penumbras, a concept that sounds far more at home in astronomy than in a courtroom, seemed like a remarkably precarious legal foundation upon which to rest something as vital as human privacy.
The Erosion of Protections
The right to privacy appeared to find slightly more concrete footing in 1967, when the Supreme Court ruled in Katz v. United States that the Fourth Amendment protected not just physical places, but people, too. This decision was widely celebrated by privacy advocates because it successfully decoupled privacy rights from traditional property rights, ensuring that Fourth Amendment protections applied in public spaces like the telephone booth where Charles Katz had been illegally transmitting bets on college basketball games.
In hindsight, however, those early celebrations look largely misplaced. The court simply required that the government obtain a warrant for its eavesdropping rather than banning the practice outright. The ruling actually normalized wiretapping and electronic surveillance as standard tools of law and order, Jenkins points out.
For modern privacy advocates, things have arguably only gone downhill from there. Through a steady series of subsequent rulings, the Supreme Court narrowed the definition of prohibited searches while simultaneously broadening the scope of permissible searches and warrants. As a direct result, constitutional protections for privacy have been progressively undermined over the decades.
To illustrate just how thoroughly these protections have been eroded, Jenkins cites the high-profile case of Monica Lewinsky, who was forced by federal prosecutors to surrender her private correspondence, personal gifts, and clothing simply because her infamous correspondent was accused of a crime, and not even a particularly severe one.
With the government granting itself that sweeping kind of subpoena power and investigative reach, privacy is no longer a securely locked door at the end of a private hallway. Instead, it has been reduced to little more than a simple paperwork requirement.
Jenkins deeply laments this steady cultural and legal retreat. It is fundamentally essential to have a private space shielded from corporate, state, and public scrutiny, she concludes—a place where human beings can simply be alone.
Yet, her comprehensive history of privacy demonstrates that, contrary to popular belief, it is neither natural nor universal to possess a private life. It is an artificial construct that society had to invent. Therefore, if we want to preserve a private life in the modern era, we are going to have to build it ourselves.

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