The fundamental premise of modern corporate governance—that companies exist solely to maximize value for their shareholders—is widely accepted as an immutable law of business. Yet, legal scholars and financial historians note that this bedrock principle is a relatively recent invention, one that has dominated the American business landscape for only the past three or four decades. For the majority of the 20th century, American corporations operated under an entirely different operational paradigm known as managerial capitalism. In this era, professional administrators and executives viewed themselves as stewards of permanent, enduring institutions, balancing the competing interests of a broad array of stakeholders rather than serving equity holders alone.
This system of managerial capitalism was famously characterized by the era of the "Organization Man," during which the legal control of a corporation was largely decoupled from its direct ownership. However, this structure carried its own distinct set of systemic excesses and opportunities for corporate self-dealing. These vulnerabilities were vividly illustrated in popular culture and investigative reporting, perhaps most memorably in the classic financial book Barbarians at the Gate. The text documented the extravagant lifestyle of R.J. Reynolds’ CEO, whose corporate privileges included the infamous "RJR Air Force"—a fleet of private planes utilized for weekend golf outings and personal vacations. In one extraordinary and much-cited anecdote, the sole passenger on a corporate flight was the CEO’s German Shepherd, which was flown home early from a weekend trip simply to escape the consequences of biting someone.
The excesses of this managerial class were similarly dramatized in Oliver Stone’s film Wall Street, where the fictional corporate raider Gordon Gekko confronts the shareholders of Teldar Paper. Gekko lambasts the company’s investors, arguing that they are being exploited by entrenched bureaucrats who indulge in lavish steak lunches, hunting and fishing trips, corporate jets, and lucrative golden parachutes. Gekko’s central thesis—that the shareholders actually owned the enterprise and that executives were fundamentally obligated to work for them—helped popularize a radical shift in corporate ideology rooted in the economic theories of Milton Friedman.
In a landmark 1970 op-ed published in The New York Times, Friedman articulated the doctrine that would eventually reshape global capitalism. He argued that in a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the business owners and bears a direct responsibility to conduct operations in accordance with their desires. For publicly traded companies, Friedman reasoned, the shareholders are the owners, meaning executives ultimately work for them and must prioritize their financial returns above all else.
While this logic appears intuitive to modern observers, late legal scholar Lynn Stout argued that the entire framework is fundamentally flawed. In her influential scholarship, Stout maintained that corporations do not belong to their shareholders at all. Instead, she asserted that "corporations are legal entities that own themselves," existing in a manner akin to human entities that hold legal personhood and self-ownership. According to Stout, what investors actually purchase and own are simply shares—a specific type of contract between the individual shareholder and the corporate legal entity that grants limited, well-defined legal rights.
A thorough examination of these corporate contracts reveals no stipulation that executives are legally required to work exclusively for shareholders, nor do they mandate that investors must be favored over other vital stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, the broader society, or the environment. Stout maintained that the prevailing consensus dictating that corporations must be managed to maximize shareholder value is based on factually mistaken claims about corporate law.
Despite these legal nuances, American corporations have been universally operated under the banner of shareholder primacy for the last thirty to forty years—an era essentially ushered in by the ideological shifts popularized during the 1980s. Stout lamented the profound short-termism she believed this doctrine fostered, arguing that the cult of shareholder primacy consistently forces corporations to chase near-term quarterly profits at the expense of vital long-term capital investments. (Though critics of this specific critique note that contemporary corporate phenomena, such as the massive multi-billion-dollar capital expenditures currently driving the artificial intelligence boom, suggest corporations are still capable of massive long-term bets.)
As an alternative to shareholder primacy, Stout advocated for a return to the principles of managerial capitalism. In her historical analysis, this earlier model successfully financed and built massive public infrastructure projects, such as canals and railroads, with comparatively less regard for immediate financial returns and a much stronger focus on long-term utility and societal value. She observed that investors in these early corporate entities were frequently also the primary customers. Consequently, they structured their enterprises to ensure the business provided reliable service at a reasonable price, rather than obsessing over maximizing investment returns.
This historical tension between investor primacy and stakeholder utility raises a pressing question for modern decentralized finance: Is this how crypto protocols should be structured as well?
The prevailing debate within the cryptocurrency ecosystem centers on how to design governance tokens that grant token holders the kinds of formal rights that traditional shareholders think they possess in legacy financial markets. However, if Stout’s legal analysis of the corporation is correct, striving to replicate traditional shareholder rights might be fundamentally the wrong goal for decentralized networks.
Without formal, rigid ownership rights, crypto tokens might naturally attract a different breed of participant—investors who behave less like Gordon Gekko and more like the 19th-century capitalists who eagerly funded foundational infrastructure projects like canals and railroads. Those historic transportation networks were complex systems that might never have materialized if their parent companies had been operated under strict mandates to maximize short-term profits for equity holders.
Decentralized protocols are similarly complex networks. Even though these protocols are frequently operated and discussed in ways that mimic traditional corporations, Stout’s academic work demonstrates that there is more than one viable framework for defining the rights and responsibilities of investors.
If crypto protocols are intended to function solely as vehicles for maximizing financial returns for speculative investors, then token holders should indeed be granted formal governance rights that cement their status as traditional owners. However, if the broader ethos of crypto finance is meant to establish a new paradigm of participatory capital, it may ultimately prove far more productive to grant token holders fewer formal rights—or potentially none at all.
Rather than offering the kinds of traditional legal protections designed to attract profit-maximizing speculators, protocols could instead rely directly on their active users to fund and sustain their ongoing development. This architectural shift could allow decentralized networks to evolve into organizational forms that are fundamentally distinct from profit-maximizing corporations.
Conceivably, this user-centric model could turn out to be the most robust and reliable guarantee for token holders themselves. Investors who are simultaneously active users of a network are often treated much better than investors who view their holdings purely through the lens of detached ownership. When the customer and the capitalist are unified into a single participant, the only viable path to maximizing value for both groups is to build a protocol that genuinely works in practice.

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