Google announced today that it has successfully worked alongside a coalition of industry partners to dismantle a sprawling botnet consisting of more than 1.3 million Android TV set-top boxes. These devices were shipped directly to consumers pre-installed with malicious software designed to secretly rent out users’ internet connections to anonymous strangers while simultaneously conducting extensive advertising fraud. Security experts involved in the collaborative takedown emphasize that this decisive action is likely to sever the botnet’s underlying access to more than 10 million additional compromised systems globally. These supplementary systems include a wide range of Internet of Things (IoT) products, such as Android-based healthcare devices, digital signage systems, and karaoke machines.
A comprehensive new report published by the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) reveals that Google has formally severed all business ties with Videostrong Technology Co., a prominent TV box manufacturer based in China. According to conclusions reached by GTIG and other independent industry experts, Videostrong was directly responsible for embedding the malicious code that enrolled more than 1.3 million set-top boxes into the botnet, which researchers have dubbed "XCPE" after one of the malware’s core code components.
The GTIG report details how the XCPE botnet weaponized infected hardware by loading software that automatically makes a victim’s residential internet address available for resale by multiple commercial "residential proxy" services. These proxy services allow third-party customers to rent residential IP addresses as a mechanism to anonymize their web traffic or geographically spoof their true location. As cybersecurity analysts have documented extensively over the past year, residential proxy networks have emerged as a primary source of unwanted and frequently malicious web traffic, fueling widespread account takeover attacks, sophisticated advertising fraud, and aggressive mass content scraping operations designed to feed artificial intelligence training projects.
"Videostrong monetized the backdoor by selling access to criminal affiliates and loading those affiliates’ malware modules onto infected devices," the GTIG blog post reads. The report notes that Google took direct legal action to seize and neutralize the domains and infrastructure servers that Videostrong utilized to command the botnet and push additional payloads. "A device manufacturer intentionally infecting their users with malware is an unacceptable breach of trust, and represents a serious risk to those users. Without users’ knowledge or consent, infected devices were offered as a distribution mechanism for a wide array of criminal actors."
While Android TV set-top boxes constituted the overwhelming majority of the botnet’s footprint, the GTIG investigation uncovered the exact same XCPE malware embedded within alternative Android-based IoT products. These included telehealth devices, karaoke machines, and digital signage systems deployed in various commercial and residential settings.
Google maintains that it requires all authorized Android device manufacturers to undergo rigorous compatibility and security testing protocols to ensure their hardware products do not compromise consumer safety. Nevertheless, Videostrong managed to circumvent these safeguards, engineering its firmware to load the malicious software immediately upon a user booting up the device for the first time. Google confirms that it has since updated its verification and defense mechanisms to address this specific vulnerability.

The GTIG report explicitly calls out a number of prominent residential proxy providers whose software development kits (SDKs) were routinely downloaded and leveraged by devices ensnared in the XCPE botnet. Among those named is AppSalt, also widely known as Honeygain, which was originally developed by the Vilnius, Lithuania-based company Oxylabs. In October 2026, Oxylabs and Honeygain underwent a corporate restructuring, emerging as independent platforms under a new umbrella entity named Source. This reorganization followed a substantial $130 million funding injection from private equity firm Warburg Pincus, a transaction that reportedly valued the business at approximately $3.6 billion.
Another proxy provider explicitly linked to the botnet’s operations is NetNut, a sprawling residential proxy enterprise operated by Alarum Technologies, a publicly traded Israeli company. In July 2026, the Federal Bureau of Investigation collaborated with industry cybersecurity partners to seize hundreds of internet domains associated with NetNut. Law enforcement asserted at the time that the company was responsible for operating a separate, parallel botnet called Popa that similarly enslaved Android TV boxes to function as residential proxy exit nodes. Additional proxy providers identified in the GTIG report include EarnFM, Traffmonetizer, Jaguar, LINKFOG, BMW/IPWeb, and GaGaNode.
Google’s public disclosure credits a robust coalition of industry partners for aiding in the investigation, most notably Synthient, a specialized security startup that continuously tracks residential proxy infrastructure. In January 2026, Synthient published groundbreaking research detailing the rapid, global proliferation of the Kimwolf botnet, which at the time was bombarding networks worldwide with record-breaking distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Synthient documented how Kimwolf managed to infect millions of Android set-top boxes almost overnight by exploiting widespread vulnerabilities inherent in these residential proxy services to pivot and compromise other connected Android devices residing on the local networks of unsuspecting consumers.
The publication of Synthient’s research prompted dozens of residential proxy providers to hurriedly patch their networks, successfully fragmenting the Kimwolf botnet into much smaller, isolated segments. This fragmentation rendered its incessant and disruptive DDoS attacks far easier for network operators and defenders to mitigate. The research also caught the attention of the Motion Picture Association (MPA), the major trade group representing Hollywood film studios. The MPA partnered with Synthient to purchase, reverse-engineer, and dismantle a variety of popular Android TV set-top boxes, including several models actively infected by Kimwolf and related IoT botnets.
In a companion report published concurrently with Google’s announcement, Synthient examined a popular, pre-infected streaming device sold under the brand name MECOOL by Skyworth Technology, a publicly traded company based in China. Synthient concluded that MECOOL units similarly bundled the malicious firmware originating from Videostrong Technology Co., while also pre-installing AppSalt/Honeygain and other proxy components.
Synthient founder Ben Brundage explained in an interview that Videostrong’s malware payload also distributed software associated with the Grass proxy service. This mirrors findings from a November 2025 investigation where researchers from Censys discovered that the popular Superbox TV streaming device bundled Grass residential proxy software—an association that the founder of Grass repeatedly denied.
As detailed in previous security reporting, hardware brands like Superbox and their imitators typically acquire new consumer bases by enlisting social media influencers on platforms like TikTok. These influencers heavily promote the devices by highlighting their ability to deliver hundreds of pirated pay-TV streaming channels and premium content networks for a single, low, up-front fee.

Similarly, Synthient’s report observes that MECOOL set-top boxes experienced an explosive surge in consumer popularity after being featured in a 2023 video by the prominent YouTube channel Linus Tech Tips, which boasts an audience of nearly 17 million subscribers. In a statement shared with Synthient, representatives for Linus Tech Tips confirmed that they have since updated the original video to explicitly frame the product as a security risk and scam, while removing all associated commercial affiliate links.
While the GTIG report specifically tallies 1.3 million active systems in the core XCPE botnet, analysts believe the true scope of the infection is substantially higher. The report estimates that the coordinated takedown should sever access to at least 10 million additional compromised devices, noting that Videostrong’s various proxy and ad fraud affiliates maintained diversified distribution channels for their malicious modules well beyond the confines of XCPE.
Brundage echoed this assessment, characterizing the official 1.3 million figure as highly conservative. "The scale of affected devices is likely way higher," he said, describing the operation as arguably the largest targeted action against backdoored streaming TV boxes witnessed to date.
In a statement issued following the initial publication of these findings, Oxylabs clarified that while its technical architecture is intentionally designed to prevent a consumer device from operating as a proxy exit node unless it receives explicit verification of user consent, the malicious developer successfully fabricated these consent signals.
"We have been conducting regular audits of the applications provided by our partners," Oxylabs stated. "However, following this incident, we will improve the application and application’s build fingerprinting logic to better detect cases where the SDK is running on an unapproved build of an originally authorized application."
Oxylabs added that it had no prior corporate record of any entity named Videostrong Technology Co., though it did identify the domain com.abc[.]nexus—referenced in the GTIG report as an external malware loader—among its roster of suppliers. "As soon as we saw that, we suspended the relationship and sent them a formal legal inquiry. This supplier accounts for less than 1% of our IP address pool. We had a signed contract with them, they assured our QA team that users had given consent, and we saw the consent flow ourselves."

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