This is a segment from The Breakdown newsletter.
“It is essential for human flourishing that we conduct substantial parts of our lives unobserved.”
— Tiffany Jenkins
Long before the advent of digital encryption, end-to-end messaging applications, or surveillance capitalism, humanity’s first major technological breakthrough in personal privacy was remarkably mundane: the hallway.
The origin of this architectural safeguard dates back to 1716, when the Duchess of Marlborough raised pointed questions to the architect designing Blenheim Palace regarding the peculiar inclusion of numerous long, narrow rooms in his blueprints. The architect was forced to explain that these spaces were meant to serve as nothing more than passages between rooms. Another contemporary builder articulated the radical purpose behind this new structural design, noting proudly that all the rooms in the house were private—meaning there was a designated way into each of them without forcing a visitor to physically pass through any other room to get there.
In other words, the hallway single-handedly created architectural privacy.
It took a full century for this simple yet revolutionary architectural feature to become a commonplace standard in European home design, but once it did, the Victorians embraced it wholeheartedly. As cultural historian Tiffany Jenkins observes in her compelling book Strangers and Intimates: The Rise and Fall of Private Life, the era before the widespread adoption of hallways was one defined by a complete lack of personal boundaries.
Before this era, there was no strictly separate private sphere, and virtually no aspect of human life remained unexposed to potential intrusion. The outside world could comfortably pry into anyone’s business, and socially, it was expected to do so. Curiosity and nosiness were not just tolerated; they were actively mandated by the social norms of the time.
Counterintuitively, the first cultural shifts away from this pervasive nosiness began with the Puritans. Their fierce insistence that matters of individual religion and personal conscience belonged strictly to the realm of private freedoms established the very first boundaries that the sovereign state was forbidden to cross. Once this initial zone of non-interference was successfully carved out, it gradually expanded into the broader Victorian definition of privacy—a concept that slowly grew to encompass and protect bedrooms, personal communications, and private commerce.
The fragility and rising value of this newly minted privacy zone were famously tested in 1844, when the British government was caught red-handed secretly opening the mail of Italian political exile Giuseppe Mazzini. Authorities were actively snooping on his correspondence with fellow Italian revolutionaries, believing it posed a threat to stability.
Mazzini, however, managed to definitively prove the illegal surveillance by instructing trusted friends to mail him letters packed exclusively with grains of sand and tiny poppy seeds. When the letters arrived at his door completely empty—the sand and seeds having fallen out during the government’s clumsy, covert inspection—the blatant breach of privacy ignited immediate national outrage across Great Britain.
Intellectuals and politicians alike did not mince words regarding the scandal. The prominent essayist Thomas Carlyle publicly condemned the practice of opening a man’s letters as a vile “scoundrelism” directly equivalent to picking his pocket. Meanwhile, Radical Member of Parliament Thomas Duncombe denounced the tactic as inherently “subversive of the public confidence essential to a commercial country.”
Perhaps most tellingly, the intricate plots of two major Charles Dickens novels—Bleak House and Little Dorrit—revolved directly around stolen letters that threatened to expose sensitive family connections and confidential economic dealings. All of these cultural and political touchstones confirmed, as Jenkins notes, that a profound revolution in the value and esteem of privacy had securely taken place.
Yet, while the Victorians were the cultural pioneers who first embraced this ideal, the United States became the first nation to attempt to write it explicitly into law—though the process was far from straightforward.
In 1890, legal scholars Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published The Right to Privacy, a foundational and deeply influential law review article arguing for a fundamental “right to be let alone.” The piece was written largely in direct response to the aggressive privacy intrusions of sensationalist newspapers and the sudden proliferation of early photography, which threatened to capture and broadcast private moments to the masses.
This publication marked a seminal moment in the history of privacy rights, according to Jenkins. However, in the course of researching their landmark article, the two young lawyers made a startling discovery: there was no explicit mention of privacy anywhere in the United States Constitution, not even within the sweeping language of the Amendments.
Despite the profound intellectual and legal influence of Warren and Brandeis’s article, this constitutional silence on privacy persisted unchanged for decades.
By 1928, the issue reached a critical juncture when the Supreme Court upheld the federal government’s use of warrantless wiretaps in the landmark case Olmstead v. United States. The court ruled that wiretapping did not violate the protections of the Fourth Amendment, reasoning that the surveillance did not involve a physical trespass onto the defendant’s private property.
Dissenting fiercely on behalf of four minority justices, Louis Brandeis issued a chilling and remarkably prescient warning. He argued that the continuous progress of science in furnishing the government with sophisticated tools of espionage was unlikely to stop with simple wiretapping. He predicted that ways might someday be developed by which the government, without ever removing physical papers from secret drawers, could reproduce them inside a courtroom, thereby enabling authorities to expose the most intimate occurrences of the private home directly to a jury.
History has proven Justice Brandeis entirely correct. (Less prophetically, Brandeis also speculated that advances in psychic and related sciences might eventually bring about means of exploring unexpressed human beliefs, thoughts, and emotions.)
It was not until the 1965 Supreme Court ruling in Griswold v. Connecticut that the judiciary finally asserted a constitutional right to privacy. Even then, establishing that right required a heavy dose of creative legal logic. To rule that privacy constituted an inherent constitutional right, Justice William O. Douglas famously argued that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights possessed “penumbras”—shadows cast by those explicit rules—which, when drawn together, added up to a de facto right to privacy.
This concept of penumbras, which sounds considerably more astronomical than legal, provided what many felt was a precarious and fragile foundation for modern privacy rights.
The legal landscape shifted toward something slightly more concrete in 1967, when the Supreme Court ruled in Katz v. United States that the Fourth Amendment protected people, not just physical places. Privacy advocates widely celebrated the decision because it successfully decoupled privacy rights from strict property ownership, ensuring that Fourth Amendment protections followed individuals into public spaces—such as the public telephone booth from which Charles Katz had been illegally conducting underground bets on college basketball games.
In hindsight, however, those celebratory reactions appear largely misplaced. The court ultimately merely required law enforcement to secure a judicial warrant for its eavesdropping activities. Rather than dismantling state surveillance, the ruling actually normalized wiretapping as an accepted, routine tool of law and order, as Jenkins points out.
For modern privacy advocates, things have steadily deteriorated ever since that era. Through a subsequent series of legal rulings, the Supreme Court progressively narrowed the legal definition of prohibited searches while simultaneously broadening the scope of permissible searches and warrants. As a direct result, constitutional protections for personal privacy have been steadily undermined over the decades.
To illustrate the sheer depth of this erosion, Jenkins points to the high-profile case of Monica Lewinsky, who was legally compelled to surrender her private correspondence, personal gifts, and even clothing simply because her infamous correspondent was accused of a crime—and not even a violent or severe one.
When the government routinely grants itself that sweeping level of subpoena power, privacy ceases to be a locked door at the end of a private hallway. Instead, it is reduced to little more than a bureaucratic paperwork requirement.
Jenkins laments this steady cultural and legal decline. She concludes that it remains essential for modern society to maintain private spaces shielded effectively from corporate, state, and public scrutiny—a place where individuals can simply be alone.
Yet, her comprehensive history of privacy demonstrates a stark reality that runs directly contrary to popular belief: it is neither natural nor universal to have a private life. If humanity truly wants one in the modern era, we are going to have to build it ourselves.

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