The fundamental premise of the modern corporation—that businesses exist solely to maximize value for their shareholders—is often accepted as an immutable law of commerce. Yet, legal scholars and economic historians point out that this doctrine is a relatively recent invention, one that has dominated corporate governance for only the past few decades. For most of the 20th century, American corporations operated under an entirely different paradigm known as managerial capitalism, an era where control was decoupled from ownership and professional administrators viewed themselves as stewards of permanent, self-sustaining institutions.
During this period of managerial capitalism, the "Organization Man" reigned supreme. Professional executives balanced the competing interests of a broad array of stakeholders rather than answering exclusively to equity investors. However, this system also fostered legendary corporate excesses. These abuses were immortalized in popular culture, such as the real-world account of the "RJR Air Force" in Barbarians at the Gate—a fleet of private corporate jets utilized by the CEO of R.J. Reynolds for weekend golf outings and personal trips to his vacation home, including one infamous instance where the sole passenger on a corporate flight was the executive’s German Shepherd, flown home early to escape the consequences of a biting incident.
The dramatic friction of this era was similarly captured on the silver screen in the 1980s movie Wall Street. In a classic scene, corporate raider Gordon Gekko castigates the shareholders of Teldar Paper, arguing that they were being exploited by entrenched company management. Gekko famously told the crowd that they were being "royally screwed over by these bureaucrats, with their steak lunches, their hunting and fishing trips, their corporate jets, and golden parachutes."
Gekko’s argument—that the shareholders actually owned the company and that executives were merely their hired agents—was deeply rooted in the economic philosophy of Milton Friedman. In a landmark 1970 op-ed published in The New York Times, Friedman asserted that in a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the business owners. According to Friedman, the manager’s direct and singular responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with the desires of those owners, which, in the case of publicly traded corporations, meant the shareholders.
Intuitive as Friedman’s thesis may seem to modern observers, legal scholar Lynn Stout argued that the entire framework is fundamentally flawed. In her influential work, Stout maintained that corporations do not belong to their shareholders; rather, corporations own themselves, much in the same way human entities own themselves.
What shareholders actually own, Stout explained, are shares—a specific type of contract between the individual investor and the independent legal entity that grants investors limited legal rights. Nowhere within that standard corporate contract is it stipulated that executives work exclusively for shareholders, nor does it mandate that management must favor investors over other stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, the broader society, or the environment. The pervasive idea that corporations should be managed primarily to maximize shareholder value, Stout maintained, rests on factually mistaken claims about corporate law.
Nevertheless, that shareholder-first philosophy is precisely how American corporations have been governed almost universally since the era popularized by Gordon Gekko. Stout lamented the short-termism spawned by this cultural shift, arguing that the modern cult of shareholder primacy has consistently forced corporations to prioritize near-term profits and quarterly earnings over long-term strategic investment.
Despite these concerns, critics of Stout’s historical assessment point to contemporary market realities—such as the massive, multi-billion-dollar capital expenditures pouring into artificial intelligence infrastructure—as evidence that modern corporations are still quite capable of funding sweeping, long-term technological bets under the current governance model.
Instead of shareholder primacy, Stout advocated for a deliberate return to the principles of early managerial capitalism. In her view, this older form of corporate organization successfully built foundational public infrastructure, such as nineteenth-century canals and railroads, with less fixation on immediate financial returns and a much greater focus on long-term utility and public service.
Because investors in those early corporate entities were frequently also the primary customers, they deliberately structured their businesses to ensure reliable service at reasonable prices, rather than bending every operational decision toward maximizing investment returns.
This historical tension between investor rights, customer utility, and network development brings up an increasingly urgent question for the modern digital economy: Is that how crypto protocols should be structured as well?
The prevailing debate in the cryptocurrency ecosystem centers on how to grant token holders the formal governance rights and financial privileges that traditional equity shareholders think they possess in mainstream finance. However, if Stout’s legal analysis of the corporation is correct, striving to replicate traditional shareholder rights might be the entirely wrong strategic goal for decentralized networks.
Without formal ownership rights tethering a protocol to strict profit-maximization mandates, tokens might attract a different breed of participant—investors who behave less like Gordon Gekko and more like the nineteenth-century financiers who eagerly funded societally beneficial canals and railroads. Those early transportation projects were fundamentally networks, and many of them might never have been constructed if their parent companies had been run under the strict modern constraints of maximizing shareholder value above all else.
Crypto protocols are, at their core, digital networks as well. Even though these protocols are frequently launched, funded, and operated like traditional technology startups, Stout’s historical and legal work demonstrates that there is more than one viable way to conceptualize the rights and responsibilities of investors.
If the primary objective of crypto protocols is strictly to maximize financial returns for investors, then token holders should indeed be granted robust governance rights that formally elevate them to Gordon Gekko-style owners. However, if crypto finance is truly intended to serve as a new kind of participatory economic capital, it might prove far more productive to grant token holders fewer formal rights—or perhaps even none at all.
Rather than offering the heavy legal protections and financial guarantees designed to attract profit-maximizing speculators, protocols could instead rely directly on their active users to fund and sustain their development. This approach could allow decentralized networks to evolve into economic entities fundamentally distinct from traditional, profit-maximizing corporations.
Conceivably, this user-centric model could turn out to be the most reliable and valuable guarantee for token holders as well. Investors who are simultaneously active users of a network are often treated far better than investors whose only relationship to an organization is financial extraction. When the customer and the capitalist merge into one and the same entity, the only way to genuinely maximize value for both investors and users is to build and maintain something that actually works.

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