The Ethereum network’s upcoming upgrade, tentatively titled Glamsterdam, has hit a temporary roadblock on its path to mainnet deployment. During routine testing phases across various Ethereum testnets, security researchers from Chainsecurity identified a series of potential vulnerabilities affecting several existing smart contract projects. These vulnerabilities do not stem from standard coding bugs or logic flaws, but rather from fundamental alterations to how the Ethereum Virtual Machine handles transaction costs. Specifically, the issues arise from Ethereum Improvement Proposals (EIP) 8037 and 8038, which are designed to comprehensively rework how gas is charged for specific operations and how state access is priced.
Because numerous established decentralized applications and smart contracts rely heavily on specific gas-related invariants to function securely, these upcoming adjustments threaten to break those underlying assumptions. In response to these critical findings, AllCoreDevs (ACD) have made a pragmatic decision to delay the broader hard fork process. Consequently, the team has chosen to halt the immediate forking of the Hoodi testnet until these gas-related issues are thoroughly understood, mitigated, and resolved. Meanwhile, development work concerning the concurrent Hegota upgrade remains entirely unaffected, with engineering efforts continuing at full pace in parallel.
To reach a transparent and consensus-driven decision during upcoming AllCoreDevs calls, the development community requires comprehensive data regarding which protocols might break post-Glamsterdam and whether precise specification changes could preemptively neutralize these risks. While the Ethereum Foundation has engaged prominent security auditing firms Chainsecurity and Dedaub alongside internal auditing teams to analyze the impact, the sheer vastness of the Ethereum ecosystem means that countless third-party protocols, alongside their intricate on-chain and off-chain codebases, cannot be manually inspected by a handful of entities alone.
As a result, the core development collective has issued an urgent call to action directed squarely at independent smart contract developers, auditors, and protocol maintainers. Stakeholders are strongly encouraged to audit their own projects to determine whether they inadvertently rely on any of the eight specific invariants set to be disrupted by the Glamsterdam upgrade. To facilitate this crucial vetting process, the development team has published a dedicated repository detailing the invariants that will be altered or broken by the implementation of EIP-8037 and EIP-8038. This resource provides developers with concise explanations, practical examples, and automated prompts designed to verify the resilience of their deployed projects. Protocol teams discovering potential vulnerabilities are urged to report their findings directly to the core developers via email.
Update on Review Progress and Upcoming Governance Milestones
In the days following the initial disclosure, the response from the broader developer community has been proactive. Core contributors have already received four distinct reports identifying deployed, immutable contracts that face functional risks under the currently proposed specifications of EIP-8037 and EIP-8038. The Ethereum Foundation has expressed gratitude to those who submitted practical examples and confirmed that every received report is actively under review, with direct outreach underway to potentially affected protocols.
Parallel to these individual triage efforts, a broader wave of concern has emerged within the ecosystem regarding the safety of immutable contracts that have already been deployed to the mainnet. Critics and community members have voiced apprehension that legislative adjustments affecting legacy code are not receiving the exhaustive scrutiny required for safe network evolution. Core developers are treating these concerns with utmost seriousness. Consequently, recommendations have been made urging the AllCoreDevs collective to wait until independent audit findings are fully made public and given adequate community review before scheduling the Hoodi upgrade or finalizing revisions to the network specifications.
Should comprehensive evaluations reveal that the negative impact on deployed contracts is far too widespread to accept, the AllCoreDevs group retains the flexibility to revise the upgrade specifications entirely. Engineering work has already commenced on prototyping and reviewing several potential architectural revisions. Researchers are meticulously documenting which specific problems each revision addresses, as well as mapping out any alternate invariants that alternative specification changes might inadvertently break. These findings and potential pathways forward are scheduled for formal presentation during the AllCoreDevs Execution meeting.
The timeline leading up to these critical governance discussions involves a structured sequence of engagements and disclosure milestones. Ongoing direct outreach to potentially affected protocols and the continuous triage of incoming vulnerability reports remain active priorities. While upcoming consensus-layer meetings will not feature EIP-8037 and EIP-8038 on their immediate agendas, the formal security reports from Dedaub and ChainSecurity are slated for public delivery. Shortly thereafter, a dedicated AllCoreDevs Testing call will feature presentations from Dedaub, ChainSecurity, and the Ethereum Foundation, accompanied by an open question-and-answer session designed specifically for application developers to join and voice their perspectives. These accumulated findings and potential next steps will culminate in a comprehensive discussion during the AllCoreDevs Execution gathering, where developers emphasize that no final decisions have been pre-committed.
Developers who believe their protocols may be impacted by the upcoming gas repricing changes are advised to consult the invariants repository hosted by the Ethereum organization. Protocol maintainers and security researchers who uncover potential vulnerabilities are encouraged to submit their observations to the designated support email address, as public reports continue to be actively monitored and evaluated by the core engineering collective.

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