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The Architecture of Secrecy: How Privacy Was Invented, Defended, and Gradually Eroded

Photo: Documentation / News Illustration

“It is essential for human flourishing that we conduct substantial parts of our lives unobserved,” writer and cultural historian Tiffany Jenkins once observed. Yet, as a sweeping historical look at the evolution of modern privacy reveals, the concept of a private life is neither a universal given nor a permanent fixture of human civilization. Rather, it is a deliberate invention—one that had to be architecturally designed, culturally fought for, legally constructed, and, ultimately, quietly dismantled.

Long before digital encryption, wiretaps, or constitutional debates, privacy technology began with something as mundane as a hallway.

In 1716, the Duchess of Marlborough raised serious questions for the architect designing Blenheim Palace after noticing an abundance of long, narrow rooms mapped into the blueprints. The architect was forced to explain that these spaces were merely passages meant to connect rooms rather than serve as living quarters themselves. Another contemporary builder articulated the radical philosophy driving this new architectural layout: “All the Rooms in this House are private; that is, there is a Way into each of them without passing through any other Room.”

In short, the invention of the hallway created domestic privacy.

As Jenkins outlines in her book Strangers and Intimates: The Rise and Fall of Private Life, it took a full century for this architectural feature to become commonplace. Once it did, however, the Victorians embraced it wholeheartedly. Before the widespread adoption of hallways, there was no strictly separate private sphere. There was virtually no aspect of daily life where outside observers could not legitimately intrude. The surrounding community expected to pry into everyone’s business, and nosiness was practically a social mandate.

Counterintuitively, the cultural shift away from forced public exposure began with the Puritans. Their fierce insistence that matters of religion and conscience belonged strictly to the realm of private freedom established the very first barrier that the state was explicitly forbidden from crossing. Once this initial zone of non-interference took root, it steadily expanded into the broader Victorian definition of privacy, wrapping a protective shield around bedrooms, personal communications, and private commerce.

The fragility of this emerging boundary was dramatically tested in 1844, when the British government was caught in the act of opening the letters of political exile Giuseppe Mazzini. Officials were covertly snooping on his correspondence with Italian revolutionaries, violating the sanctity of the post.

Mazzini proved the illicit surveillance by enlisting friends to mail him ordinary letters filled with loose grains of sand and poppy seeds. When the letters arrived completely empty—the contents having fallen out through clumsy government inspections—the undeniable breach of privacy sparked fierce national outrage across Great Britain.

Intellectuals and politicians lined up to condemn the state’s actions. The prominent essayist Thomas Carlyle called opening a man’s letters a “scoundrelism” directly equivalent to picking his pocket. Radical Member of Parliament Thomas Duncombe went further, arguing that the practice was fundamentally “subversive of the public confidence essential to a commercial country.”

Most tellingly, the plots of two classic Charles Dickens novels—Bleak House and Little Dorrit—revolved entirely around stolen letters that threatened to expose sensitive family connections and private economic dealings. All of these cultural markers confirmed that a major revolution in the value and esteem of personal privacy had firmly taken hold.

Yet, while Victorian society was the first to embrace privacy as a cultural ideal, the United States was technically the first to attempt writing it into law—albeit through a roundabout legal evolution.

In 1890, legal scholars Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published The Right to Privacy, a foundational law review article arguing for a fundamental “right to be let alone.” The piece was written in direct response to the aggressive privacy intrusions of yellow journalism and early photography, which had begun commodifying personal lives for public consumption.

Jenkins describes this publication as a seminal moment in privacy history. However, in the course of researching their landmark article, the two lawyers uncovered a surprising and troubling gap: there was no mention of privacy anywhere in the United States Constitution, not even within the amendments.

Despite the profound influence of Warren and Brandeis’s scholarship, this constitutional silence on privacy persisted for decades, leaving citizens vulnerable to technological advancements.

In 1928, the Supreme Court formally upheld the federal government’s use of warrantless wiretaps in the case of Olmstead v. the United States. The majority ruled that wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the surveillance involved no physical trespass onto the defendant’s private property.

Writing on behalf of four dissenting justices, Louis Brandeis issued a remarkably prescient warning. He cautioned that the progress of science in furnishing the government with sophisticated tools of espionage was unlikely to stop with simple wiretapping. He predicted that methods would someday be developed allowing the government—without ever removing papers from secret drawers—to reproduce them in court, exposing the most intimate occurrences of the home directly to a jury.

Of course, that exact scenario has long since materialized. Less prophetically, Brandeis also warned that advances in psychological sciences might eventually bring about means of exploring unexpressed human beliefs, thoughts, and emotions.

It was not until the landmark 1965 ruling in Griswold v. Connecticut that the Supreme Court finally asserted an explicit constitutional right to privacy. Even then, the court had to rely on a measure of creative legal logic.

To rule that privacy constituted a constitutional right, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights possessed “penumbras”—shadows or emanations thrown off by explicit rules—which, when drawn together, added up to a de facto right to privacy. To many legal scholars, penumbras sounded more astronomical than legal, forming a remarkably precarious foundation for such a vital right.

The right to privacy gained slightly more concrete footing in 1967 when the Supreme Court ruled in Katz v. the United States that the Fourth Amendment protected people, not just physical places.

Privacy advocates widely celebrated the decision because it successfully decoupled privacy rights from property rights, ensuring that Fourth Amendment protections applied in public settings like the telephone booth where Charles Katz had been illegally transmitting college basketball bets.

In hindsight, however, those celebratory reactions appear largely misplaced. The court’s ruling simply mandated that law enforcement secure a warrant before engaging in electronic eavesdropping. As Jenkins notes, the decision effectively normalized wiretapping surveillance as an accepted tool of law and order.

For modern privacy advocates, the trajectory has largely been downhill ever since.

Through a succession of subsequent judicial rulings, the Supreme Court progressively narrowed the legal definition of prohibited searches while simultaneously broadening the scope of permissible searches and warrants. As a result, constitutional protections for privacy were systematically undermined.

To illustrate the true depth of this erosion, Jenkins points to the high-profile case of Monica Lewinsky, who was legally compelled to surrender her private correspondence, personal gifts, and clothing simply because her infamous correspondent happened to be accused of a crime, and not even a violent felony at that.

With the executive branch and federal courts granting themselves expansive subpoena powers of this magnitude, true privacy is no longer a locked door at the end of a hallway. Instead, it has been reduced to a mere paperwork requirement.

Jenkins deeply laments this steady decline. She concludes that maintaining a private space shielded from corporate, state, and public scrutiny remains essential—a place where human beings can simply be alone.

Ultimately, her historical analysis demonstrates that, contrary to popular belief, having a private life is neither natural nor universal. If modern society wishes to retain any semblance of privacy, it is a structure we will have to build for ourselves.

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Lina Irawan

Writer and contributor at Bitcoin 98.

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