North Korean state-sponsored hackers have turned to the creation of custom memecoins to launder digital assets stolen during the massive $6.3 billion Binance hack, according to a comprehensive new investigative report from blockchain analytics firm Elliptic.
The illicit network routed approximately $430,000 worth of stolen capital through six newly launched tokens on the NEAR blockchain. The activity took place between November 5 and 7, highlighting an evolving array of tactical shifts utilized by cybercriminals attempting to bypass onchain surveillance and throw off security researchers tracking massive crypto heists.
According to Elliptic, the threat actors deployed at least six distinct tokens on the NEAR network, utilizing decentralized exchange (DEX) liquidity pools to obfuscate the origin and destination of the stolen cryptocurrency as it moved between distinct wallets. Despite being deployed on a prominent public ledger, the newly minted tokens generated virtually zero external trading volume from everyday retail participants or independent speculators. Instead, the tokens were quickly abandoned by their creators shortly after the laundering cycle was completed.
The mechanics of the operation relied heavily on decentralized trading pairs. The hackers reportedly used a specific set of source wallets to swap stolen NEAR tokens directly for the newly created, low-liquidity memecoins. Once the initial swaps were executed, a secondary set of control wallets was deployed to liquidate those same memecoins back into the pools in exchange for clean NEAR tokens.
By routing the capital through automated market maker liquidity pools rather than executing direct peer-to-peer wallet transfers, the actors sought to break the direct transaction trail. However, because public ledgers record all smart contract interactions, the transaction chains remained fundamentally visible and traceable to meticulous blockchain investigators.

Further analysis by Elliptic revealed a tightly coordinated timeline linking the token deployments together. The analytics firm discovered that five out of the six token-creating wallets received their initial funding directly from the proceeds of earlier token sales just two to 13 minutes prior to the launch of the next asset in the sequence. This rapid-fire deployment created an unmistakable onchain chain of transactions that ultimately allowed blockchain sleuths to connect the separate operational phases.
Tom Robinson, co-founder of Elliptic, emphasized the methodical and patient nature of these digital asset laundering campaigns in the published report. He noted that North Korea’s experienced laundering operations rarely rely on a single, monolithic technique or a solitary privacy tool. Instead, the syndicates prefer to layer multiple low-cost, decentralized techniques together, with each operational step adding a minor delay and another layer of obfuscation to the overarching trail.
This recent exploitation of the NEAR blockchain is not an isolated incident for the threat actors. Elliptic pointed out that a remarkably similar laundering architecture was previously deployed in the aftermath of the staggering $1.5 billion Bybit hack in 2025. During that earlier event, actors tied to North Korean hacking syndicates successfully moved at least $24 million through a newly generated token deployed on the TRON blockchain, demonstrating a repeatable playbook across multiple alternative layer-1 and layer-2 ecosystems.
Despite the ongoing efforts by the perpetrators to launder portions of their massive digital asset stockpiles, a substantial amount of capital from the original security breach remains untouched. At the time Elliptic completed its latest onchain analysis, approximately 11.8 million NEAR tokens stolen during the initial Binance breach remained entirely unmoved in attacker-controlled wallets. Based on prevailing market valuations at the time of the report, those dormant funds were estimated to be worth roughly $43.7 million.
As blockchain analytics firms continue to refine their attribution methodologies and transaction-tracking capabilities, state-backed hacking groups are forced to adapt continuously, experimenting with niche decentralized finance protocols, obscure liquidity pools, and short-lived custom tokens in a perpetual cat-and-mouse game with international cybersecurity investigators.

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