This is a segment from The Breakdown newsletter.
“The dollar is always going to be the reserve currency. Anyway, for a long time.”
— Jerome Powell
When the price of oil suddenly quadrupled in 1973, setting off an unprecedented redistribution of wealth across the globe, Saudi Arabia was wholly unprepared for the sheer volume of billions of dollars that started flooding into its coffers. Strictly speaking, the money never actually made it “into” the Kingdom in any practical sense. Global buyers of Saudi oil sent their payments directly to accounts established at Citibank and JPMorgan in New York. There, the money sat idle because Saudi finance officials barely knew how to move it, let alone invest it across complex international financial architectures.
With billions piling up rapidly in non-interest-bearing accounts, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) reluctantly sought outside help, asking an American banker named David Mulford to manage the overwhelming capital inflows on their behalf. Mulford and a small, intrepid team packed their belongings and moved to the underdeveloped port town of Jeddah. They scrambled to secure accommodation in houses newly built in a remote part of the desert that lacked even paved roads; to get there, travelers simply drove their vehicles directly across the open sand.
The living conditions were remarkably primitive. The houses lacked telephones, televisions, regular mail delivery, and even basic municipal trash removal. The visiting bankers were forced to leave their garbage out in the desert sand for local Bedouins’ goats to feed on. The makeshift office they commuted to six days a week under the harsh desert sun was even worse. They were assigned a single room in a decrepit building, furnished sparsely with only basic chairs and desks. There were no computers, no terminals, and crucially, no telephones to connect them to the outside financial world.
Across the hall from their cramped workspace, a simple toilet was set in a long, deep room with an open drain running behind it. Mulford wrote candidly about these stark conditions in his autobiography, noting that this facility was used by their entire section of the building and flushed precisely once a day at three in the afternoon. Investment deals had to be negotiated, agreed upon, and processed via the building’s single telex machine—a hybrid device operating like a noisy typewriter and telegraph combined that was kept in constant use. A single financial transaction required dozens of back-and-forth telex messages and often took weeks of painstaking labor to complete.
And yet, as Mulford recalls of the relentless financial pressure, his team had to invest money at the rate of approximately $500 million per day simply to prevent themselves from falling behind the staggering pace of incoming petrodollars.
Mulford’s firsthand account of his nine years at SAMA fundamentally debunks the persistent, widespread conspiracy theory that the Saudis invested their immense oil windfalls into US Treasurys as part of a deliberate quid pro quo arrangement in exchange for a military security guarantee from Washington. Instead, the historical reality is much more mundane and grounded in sheer financial necessity: The Saudis invested in US Treasurys simply because they had to. At the time, no other market in the world possessed the structural capacity to absorb the staggering $20 billion a month that the Saudis desperately needed to put to work.
Furthermore, no other sovereign market was nearly as safe or as easy to invest in—critically important factors when every single transaction had to be coordinated and executed by telex across thousands of miles of ocean and desert.
SAMA actually tasked Mulford with an explicit mandate to diversify their holdings by moving 30% of their massive investment funds completely out of the US market. Yet, despite his best efforts, he repeatedly struggled to accomplish this goal due to structural limitations in global finance. In most markets outside the United States during that era, a currency trade of just $5 million to $10 million was large enough to drastically move local markets. Consequently, there were severe practical limitations on the amount of currency diversification that SAMA could realistically achieve without destabilizing the very assets they were attempting to buy.
This historical reality challenges the enduring idea that global dollar dominance can be artificially engineered through either geopolitical coercion or clever central bank policy. The Saudis chose US Treasurys because of what America actually was as an economic superpower, rather than what its politicians promised or demanded. Even in the turbulent economy of the 1970s—an era plagued concurrently by recession, rampant inflation, and a US president who resigned in disgrace—American financial markets retained the unmatched depth, defined as vast quantities of high-quality assets, liquidity, meaning the easy tradability of those assets without severe price slippage, and safety underpinned by the rule of law. These foundational attributes made it the absolute best option for the world’s largest and most cash-strapped investor.
Today, the structural appeal of the United States extends deep into corporate equity markets as well. Modern non-US investors own roughly $19 trillion of US equities, which amounts to more than double the total value of what they hold in US Treasurys. The nation also retains a central bank that has fought hard to maintain its inflation-fighting credentials and credibility, even amid intense political pressure to finance increasingly massive federal fiscal deficits.
The current chair of that central bank, Federal Reserve leader Jerome Powell, fundamentally attributes the enduring global dominance of the dollar to core “democratic institutions” and “the rule of law.” That institutional foundation is central to its appeal and longevity on the world stage. Powell added that he believes the dollar will remain the global reserve currency as long as those foundational pillars remain firmly in place.
There is, of course, no absolute guarantee that these institutional safeguards will endure forever, and a growing number of prominent economists openly doubt whether they will survive much longer in an increasingly polarized political climate. Renowned economist Ken Rogoff, for instance, has warned publicly that the dollar is slowly fraying at the edges. He points to rising anxiety among foreign investors who are increasingly worried about a visible breakdown of domestic institutions, unpredictable and erratic policymaking that runs the risk of unfairly disadvantaging foreign capital, and mounting political threats directed at central bank independence.
All of these compounding geopolitical and domestic factors are quietly adding up to a palpable loss of confidence in the long-term viability of investing safely in the United States.
If this erosion of trust continues, external efforts to artificially manufacture demand for the dollar—such as through the heavy promotion of dollar-pegged stablecoins—are unlikely to provide any meaningful rescue. Stablecoins are currently in high global demand precisely because the underlying fiat dollar is already in high demand worldwide. That is a macro-financial dynamic that is fundamentally unlikely to ever work in reverse. If the United States ultimately chooses to squander or surrender the structural advantages that underpin its currency, no amount of manufactured digital demand will be able to save it.

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