Google announced today that it has successfully worked alongside industry partners to dismantle a sprawling botnet comprising more than 1.3 million Android TV set-top boxes. These devices were shipped directly to consumers pre-installed with malicious software designed to secretly rent out users’ internet connections to strangers while simultaneously conducting widespread advertising fraud. Experts closely involved in the coordinated takedown warn that this enforcement action will likely sever the botnet’s access to more than 10 million additional compromised systems globally, including various other Internet of Things (IoT) products such as Android-based healthcare devices, karaoke machines, and digital signage systems.
According to a comprehensive report published by the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), Google has officially severed all ties with Videostrong Technology Co., a prominent TV box manufacturer based in China. GTIG and independent industry experts concluded that Videostrong was directly responsible for engineering and embedding the malware that enrolled millions of set-top boxes into the criminal network, which researchers have dubbed "XCPE" after one of its core code components.
The GTIG report details how the XCPE botnet automatically loaded infected user devices with background software designed to make home internet addresses available for resale through multiple commercial "residential proxy" services. These proxy networks allow paying customers to rent residential IP addresses to route web traffic, effectively anonymizing their online activities or spoofing their true geographic locations. Residential proxy services have increasingly become a primary source of unwanted and malicious internet traffic, frequently linked to account takeover attacks, fraudulent ad impressions, and automated mass content scraping operations deployed to feed artificial intelligence projects.
Google noted that Videostrong aggressively monetized the backdoor embedded in the hardware by selling access to various criminal affiliates, subsequently loading these external syndicates’ malware modules directly onto unsuspecting users’ devices. To disrupt the operation, Google took decisive legal action to seize and neutralize the malicious domains and infrastructure servers that Videostrong utilized to command the botnet and push additional software payloads. In its official blog post, GTIG emphasized that a hardware manufacturer intentionally pre-infecting consumer devices with malware represents an unacceptable breach of consumer trust and a severe operational security risk, turning everyday home electronics into unwitting distribution nodes for a diverse array of cybercriminal enterprises.
While standard TV streaming boxes constituted the vast majority of the infections, investigators discovered that the identical XCPE malware strain had also infected a wide range of alternative Android-based IoT products. These included telehealth devices, specialized karaoke machines, and commercial digital signage systems deployed in various public spaces.

Google maintains strict security requirements, mandating that all authorized Android device manufacturers pass rigorous compatibility and security evaluations to ensure their hardware remains safe for consumers. Despite these safeguards, investigators determined that Videostrong successfully engineered a method to execute and load its malicious code immediately upon a user booting up the hardware for the very first time. Google confirmed that it has since updated its security protocols and addressed the underlying system weakness exploited by the manufacturer.
The GTIG threat report specifically highlights several residential proxy providers whose software development kits (SDKs) were routinely downloaded and executed by devices ensnared in the XCPE botnet. Among those named is AppSalt, also widely known as Honeygain, which was developed by Oxylabs, a proxy infrastructure firm based in Vilnius, Lithuania. In October 2026, Oxylabs and Honeygain completed a corporate reorganization, launching as independent operational platforms under a newly formed umbrella entity named Source. This transition was backed by a massive $130 million funding round led by private equity firm Warburg Pincus, which reportedly valued the consolidated enterprise at approximately $3.6 billion.
Another prominent proxy provider explicitly linked to the botnet infrastructure is NetNut, a sprawling residential proxy enterprise operated by Alarum Technologies, a publicly traded company in Israel. The disruption follows an earlier international enforcement action in July 2026, when the FBI collaborated with private cybersecurity partners to seize hundreds of domains associated with NetNut. At the time, federal authorities stated that the company was responsible for operating a separate, parallel botnet known as Popa, which similarly enslaved residential Android TV boxes to serve as unauthorized proxy exit nodes. In addition to AppSalt and NetNut, the GTIG report identified several other proxy providers connected to the ecosystem, including EarnFM, Traffmonetizer, Jaguar, LINKFOG, BMW/IPWeb, and GaGaNode.
Google’s public announcement of the takedown credited a broad coalition of industry partners, including Synthient, a specialized security startup that actively tracks commercial proxy networks. In January 2026, Synthient published groundbreaking research detailing the rapid, global expansion of the Kimwolf botnet, which at the time was bombarding internet service providers worldwide with record-breaking distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Synthient documented how the Kimwolf operation managed to compromise millions of Android set-top boxes virtually overnight by exploiting widespread security vulnerabilities within residential proxy services to pivot and infect secondary Android devices residing on the local home networks of unsuspecting consumers.
The publication of Synthient’s research forced dozens of residential proxy providers to hurriedly patch security flaws in their respective networks. This defensive intervention successfully fractured the Kimwolf botnet into much smaller, isolated segments, rendering its incessant and disruptive DDoS attacks far easier for network operators and defenders to mitigate. The research also drew the focused attention of the Motion Picture Association, a major trade organization representing Hollywood film studios, which subsequently partnered with Synthient to purchase, teardown, and analyze popular Android TV set-top boxes infected by Kimwolf and other criminal IoT botnets.
In a comprehensive technical report released today, Synthient examined a popular, pre-infected streaming device sold under the brand name MECOOL by Skyworth Technology, a publicly traded manufacturing firm based in China. The investigation concluded that MECOOL hardware also bundled the malicious software originating from Videostrong Technology Co., which similarly deployed AppSalt, Honeygain, and other embedded proxy components without consumer knowledge.

Synthient founder Ben Brundage explained in an interview that Videostrong’s malware payload was additionally utilized to distribute software for Grass, another prominent proxy service. This finding mirrors previous industry investigations, including a November 2025 security report where researchers from Censys discovered that the popular Superbox streaming device came pre-bundled with Grass residential proxy software, though representatives for Grass consistently denied any formal affiliation or partnership with the hardware manufacturer.
Both investigations highlighted how consumer electronics brands like Superbox and MECOOL achieved explosive commercial growth through aggressive marketing campaigns relying on social media influencers on platforms like TikTok and YouTube. These influencers frequently praised the streaming devices for offering access to hundreds of unauthorized pay-TV channels and premium broadcasting networks for a single, low upfront fee. Similarly, Synthient’s report noted that MECOOL streaming boxes experienced a massive surge in consumer popularity after being featured in a 2023 video by the prominent YouTube channel Linus Tech Tips, which commands an audience of nearly 17 million subscribers. Representatives for Linus Tech Tips shared a statement confirming that the channel has since updated the archived video to explicitly categorize the hardware as a scam and removed all associated commercial affiliate links.
While GTIG estimates that the immediate takedown of the XCPE botnet infrastructure successfully severed access to at least 10 million additional compromised devices, security experts emphasize that the threat is far from completely eradicated. Investigators noted that Videostrong’s proxy and ad-fraud affiliates maintained diversified distribution channels for their malicious modules well beyond the XCPE framework.
Synthient founder Ben Brundage echoed this assessment, describing the verified figure of 1.3 million infected boxes as highly conservative. The actual scale of affected consumer hardware is likely significantly higher, making it one of the largest coordinated operations against pre-infected, backdoored streaming hardware recorded to date.
In a statement provided following the initial publication of these findings, representatives for Oxylabs stated that while their technical infrastructure is explicitly designed to prevent an IP address from acting as a proxy exit node unless explicit user consent signals are received, the third-party developer in question had fraudulently faked these verification signals. The company noted that it conducts routine compliance audits of all applications provided by external partners, but will immediately upgrade its application build fingerprinting logic to more effectively identify instances where an authorized SDK is illicitly executed on an unapproved software build.
Oxylabs added that it had no prior corporate record of any entity named Videostrong Technology Co. among its direct partners, though compliance teams successfully traced a suspicious external malware loader domain mentioned in the GTIG report directly to one of its registered suppliers. Company officials stated that the relationship with that specific supplier was suspended immediately and a formal legal inquiry was launched. According to Oxylabs, the implicated supplier accounted for less than one percent of its total global IP address pool, and the company possessed a fully executed contract wherein the supplier’s quality assurance team provided explicit written assurances and demonstrated valid consent flows.

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