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Beyond Shareholder Primacy: What Corporate History and Legal Theory Mean for Crypto Protocols

The idea that companies should be run strictly for the benefit of their shareholders is a relatively modern invention in the grand scheme of economic history. For the vast majority of the 20th century, American corporations operated under a completely different paradigm known as managerial capitalism—a form of capital accumulation and organizational control in which professional managers act as the central agents of power.

This was the iconic era of the "Organization Man." During this period, the ultimate control of a company was fundamentally decoupled from its ownership. Professional administrators and career executives viewed themselves not as hired guns for equity holders, but as stewards of permanent, enduring institutions. Their primary responsibility was balancing the competing interests of a broad array of stakeholders, rather than relentlessly serving shareholders alone.

Frequently, the most favored stakeholders under this system happened to be the executives themselves. In the seminal business book Barbarians at the Gate, this systemic tendency toward corporate self-dealing was vividly illustrated by the infamous "RJR Air Force"—a lavish fleet of private planes that the CEO of R.J. Reynolds utilized freely for weekend golf outings and personal trips to his private vacation home. In one particularly memorable and illustrative instance, the sole passenger on a corporate flight was the CEO’s German Shepherd, which was being sent home early from a weekend trip specifically to avoid the legal and social consequences of the dog biting someone.

The extreme excesses of managerial capitalism were also famously dramatized in Oliver Stone’s classic film Wall Street. In one of the movie’s most quoted scenes, the corporate raider Gordon Gekko stands before the assembled shareholders of Teldar Paper to inform them that they are being systematically exploited by the company’s management. "You are all being royally screwed over by these bureaucrats, with their steak lunches, their hunting and fishing trips, their corporate jets, and golden parachutes," Gekko tells the crowd.

Gekko’s core message to Teldar’s long-suffering shareholders was that they ultimately owned the company, and that executives should therefore work exclusively for them. This aggressive philosophy was deeply rooted in the economic thinking of Milton Friedman. In a landmark 1970 essay published in The New York Times, Friedman argued that "in his capacity as a corporate executive, the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the corporation."

"In a free-enterprise, private-property system," Friedman added, elaborating on his free-market doctrine, "a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires." In the case of modern publicly traded corporations, Friedman reasoned, the shareholders owned the business, meaning they were the ultimate masters whom executives were obligated to serve.

Rethinking Corporate Ownership

As intuitive and universally accepted as that framework feels in modern finance, late legal scholar Lynn Stout argued that the entire premise is fundamentally flawed. "Corporations own themselves," Stout famously asserted, "just as human entities own themselves."

What shareholders actually own, Stout explained at length in her work, are simply shares—which are best understood as a specialized type of legal contract between the shareholder and the independent legal entity that grants investors limited legal rights. Nowhere within that foundational contract does it stipulate that executives work directly for shareholders, nor does it mandate that they must favor investors over any other corporate stakeholder, whether those stakeholders happen to be employees, customers, suppliers, the broader society, or the environment.

"The idea that corporations should be managed to maximize shareholder value," Stout stated, "is based on factually mistaken claims about the law."

Nevertheless, that precise doctrine is exactly how American corporations have been run, almost universally, for the past three or four decades—ever since the era popularized by Gordon Gekko and entrenched by decades of Chicago School economics. Stout consistently lamented the intense short-termism she believed this mindset fostered. She argued that a cultural cult of "shareholder primacy" has systematically caused corporations to sacrifice long-term capital investments, research, and institutional resilience in a frantic pursuit of near-term quarterly profits.

Yet, economic realities continue to evolve, and critics might counter that massive paradigm shifts, such as the contemporary multi-billion-dollar boom in artificial intelligence infrastructure and research investments, demonstrate that modern corporations are still capable of funding long-term bets under a shareholder-primacy regime.

Even so, Stout advocated passionately for a structural return to the kind of traditional managerial capitalism that predated the shareholder-value revolution. In her historical analysis, earlier iterations of capitalism successfully built massive foundational infrastructure—such as canals, turnpikes, and railroads—with far less obsessive regard for immediate financial returns and a much higher regard for long-term functional utility.

"Investors in these early corporations were usually also customers," she reasoned, highlighting how early corporate charters were designed. "They structured their companies to make sure the business would provide good service at a reasonable price—not to maximize investment returns."

Applying Corporate Lessons to Web3

This historical debate leads directly to a modern crossroads: Is that how emerging crypto protocols and decentralized finance networks should be structured, too?

The central, ongoing debate across the cryptocurrency landscape centers on how to properly grant token holders the kinds of formal governance rights and financial privileges that traditional equity shareholders think they possess in corporate finance. Developers and founders constantly wrestle with how to decentralize protocols by giving token holders voting power, revenue shares, and direct administrative influence.

However, if Stout’s legal analysis of the modern corporation is fundamentally correct, mirroring traditional corporate governance may be the entirely wrong goal for decentralized networks.

Without formal, heavy-handed ownership rights and guaranteed profit extraction mechanisms, tokens might attract a vastly different breed of capital allocator. Instead of drawing short-term speculators resembling Gordon Gekko, tokenized networks might attract participants who behave more like the 19th-century shareholders who eagerly funded societally and economically beneficial canals and railroads without demanding immediate financial extraction.

Railroads and canals were massive, interconnected networks, after all—networks that likely never would have been built or successfully scaled if those 19th-century entities had been operated under the strict modern mandate to maximize short-term profits for external shareholders at all costs.

Decentralized protocols and blockchain networks are, at their core, networks as well. Even though these protocols are frequently launched, marketed, and operated much like traditional venture-backed technology companies, Stout’s historical and legal work demonstrates that there is more than one viable way to conceptualize the rights and responsibilities of investors.

If crypto protocols are designed solely to maximize financial returns for external investors, then yes, token holders should inevitably be granted the legal and structural rights that transform them into Gordon Gekko-like owners. But if the broader ethos of crypto finance is genuinely meant to foster a new kind of participatory, community-owned capital, it might ultimately be far more productive to grant token holders fewer formal rights.

In some cases, perhaps they should receive none at all.

Rather than offering the kind of heavy legal protections and speculative upside that primarily attract profit-maximizing investors, protocols could instead rely heavily on their active users to fund, guide, and sustain their early development. This philosophical shift might allow blockchain networks to evolve into economic structures that are fundamentally different from traditional, profit-maximizing corporations.

Conceivably, that approach could turn out to be the most durable and useful guarantee for token holders as well. Investors who are also active, day-to-day users of a platform may ultimately be treated far better by the network than investors who act purely as external financial owners looking for an exit. When the customer and the capitalist are unified into one and the same participant, the only way to genuinely maximize value for both investors and users is to build and maintain something that actually works.

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Asro

Writer and contributor at Bitcoin 98.

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